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An Electroencephalographic Analysis of Strategy Usage During Social Dilemmas
by
Nick Wan, Bachelors of Science
Utah State University, 2022
Major Professor: Dr. Kerry E. Jordan
Department: Psychology
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a research area that examines how people theorize and
simulate the actions of another person. Social dilemma games, in which participants
compete over a shared or common resource, offer researchers a context to observe the use
of cognitive strategies that have the potential to maximize optimal outcomes. Abiding by
a strategy helps minimize negative returns and maximize positive returns, especially in
competitive scenarios. Two strategies used in social dilemma games are tit-for-tat (TFT)
and win-stay-lose-switch (WSLS). TFT occurs when a person selects the choice the
opponent chose in a previous game iteration whereas WSLS occurs when a person
continues to select a choice if an outcome was positive and switches when an outcome is
negative. However, the social side of social dilemmas are somewhat understudied.
Strategy has clear benefits in social dilemmas, but how do strategies affect how people
interpret what an opponent may do in the next choice? ToM during social dilemmas
would make sense since the actions of an opponent could influence a person to reflect
and modify their own actions to counteract the next choice of an opponent. This sort of
estimation of an opponent’s choice, or mentalization, certainly sounds like strategy but

there are key differences between ToM and strategic behavior. Strategic behaviors, like
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TFT or WSLS, are rooted in quantifiable behavior. Choices influenced by ToM may not
be rooted in quantifiable behavior. TFT and WSLS strategies do not require estimating
the next choice of an opponent, but ToM requires opponent choice estimation. Since a
person choosing using TFT or WSLS may not be using ToM during a social dilemma, a
person using one of these strategies may not have the same neural activity as someone
choosing by ToM even if both come to the same choice. Since TFT or WSLS possibly
affect the need of ToM in social dilemmas, these quantifiable strategies could
downregulate ToM activity in social dilemmas. To investigate whether this is possible, 31
participants participated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma while being recorded via
electroencephalography (EEG). Sixteen participants were trained to perform either TFT
or WSLS (the strategy group) while 15 participants did not train or perform either TFT or
WSLS (the control group). The strategy group differed from the control group by
showing significantly less alpha desynchrony than the control group in ToM areas
(channels AF3 and P8) when faced with an opponent whose cooperation rate varied from
one half of the experiment to the other half. The differences suggest choice processing
differs when selecting by TFT or WSLS versus selecting by ToM. Furthermore, greater
ToM activity for the control group may indicate strategy downregulates ToM during
social dilemmas.
(105 pages)
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An Electroencephalographic Analysis of Strategy Usage During Social Dilemmas
Nick Wan

The neuroscience of strategy usage during social dilemmas is said to require Theory of
Mind (ToM). The process of ToM takes into consideration the actions of another person,
so implications with strategies like tit-for-tat (TFT) or win-stay-lose-switch (WSLS) are
logical. However, using either TFT or WSLS does not require ToM since these strategies
are based on the previous opponent choice. Thus using a quantifiable strategy like TFT or
WSLS during a social dilemma game may not necessarily incur activation of ToM. To
investigate whether this is possible, 31 participants participated in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma while being recorded via electroencephalography (EEG). 16 participants were
trained and performed either TFT or WSLS (strategy group) while 15 participants did not
train or perform either TFT or WSLS (control group). The strategy group differed from
the control group by showing significantly less alpha desynchrony than the control group
in ToM areas (channels AF3 and P8) when faced with an opponent whose cooperation
rate varied from one half of the experiment to the other half. The differences suggest
choice processing differs when selecting by TFT or WSLS versus selecting by ToM.
Furthermore, greater ToM activity for the control group may indicate strategy
downregulates ToM during social dilemmas.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers have become increasingly interested in merging social
sciences with neurosciences in hopes to provide greater insight into human cognition and
behavior (Fitzgerald & Callard 2015; Butler, O’Broin, Lee, & Senior, 2016; Wade et al.,
2018). Social interactions have become an emerging interest in social cognitive
neuroscience, more specifically studying the process by which humans can interpret the
emotions or intentions of other humans based on social norms, actions, environment, or
social cues. This is commonly referred to as Theory of Mind (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014;
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Brown & Brune, 2012; Carrington
& Bailey, 2009; Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013; Deen et al., 2015; Hein & Knight,
2008; Lissek et al., 2008; Mahy et al., 2014; Redcay, 2008; Rilling et al., 2004; Rilling &
Sanfey, 2011; Sanfey, 2007; Schultz et al., 2004; Soutchek et al., 2015; Wellman & Liu,
2004; Yoshida et al., 2010). A common example of Theory of Mind (ToM) is a
handshake. It is a common social interaction in society but broken down into steps it
involves several complex processes. A person must first conceptualize what the social
norm is (handshake) and have an understanding of the intention or purpose of the norm (a
greeting). Second, a person must have a response to the behavior, like reciprocating a
social norm (e.g., extending your arm to engage a handshake). Lastly, the execution of
these behaviors generates new knowledge, which further informs the conceptual
understanding of social interactions -- either with a specific individual or generalized to
all individuals. Another term for this is mentalizing. ToM or mentalizing helps humans
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navigate complex social scenarios by aligning perceived expectations of events with
actual events, generating more information about an event over time.

Theory Theory: A Theory of Mind sub-theory
ToM can further be broken down into different sub-theories. Two well-studied
sub-theories are Simulation Theory and Theory Theory (Carrington & Bailey, 2009;
Mahy et al., 2014). Simulation Theory is the idea that perceiving actions requires using
personal knowledge in order to mentalize the actions of another person (Carrington &
Bailey, 2009; Mahy et al., 2014). Mental “simulation” can further inform a person on
how to interpret or react to subsequent actions from another person. On the neural level,
Simulation Theory involves neural activation in the mirror neuron system (Carrington &
Bailey, 2009; Mahy et al., 2014). The mirror neuron system activates whenever an
individual perceives the actions, emotions, or intentions of another or mentalizes selfactions, emotions, or intentions (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Mahy et al., 2014). Recent
studies demonstrate mirror neuron activity by using a joint-action task (Carrington &
Bailey, 2009; Mahy et al., 2014). During the experiment, two participants perform a task
where one participant is doing an action and the other participant observes this action in
real-time. The findings show neural activity when observing a given action correlates
with the neural activity when performing the same action.
Theory Theory is the idea that humans have set beliefs about a given situation and
those beliefs are held to be true unless violated (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Mahy et al.,
2014). When a violation occurs, a person will update beliefs to compensate for the
violations. In a 2010 study by Sabbagh et al., the authors sought to examine the
relationship between how people adjust their behaviors and their concepts when an object
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unexpectedly became heavy. Participants performed a load force adjustment task where
individuals would lift objects. The object sizes may be incongruent with object weight.
This task used a small box which was perceived as light in weight but some boxes of
similar proportions were heavier than perceived. Over time, participants updated their
expectations of small box objects in order to prepare for unexpectedly heavy loads. The
neural results of the study revealed belief-updating activity was most apparent in inferior
parietal areas, most particularly related to the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). This
study was performed with both adults and children, providing evidence that beliefupdating, or Theory Theory, is apparent throughout development and into adulthood.
ToM, and more specifically Theory Theory, is important because belief-updating
promotes expectations that lead to neural and behavioral responses (Mahy et al., 2014,
Yoshida et al., 2010). Belief-updating can be discussed separate from behavior in the
sense that social behaviors (like handshakes) rely upon previous beliefs, but beliefs
themselves are internal concepts that may not be specific to a single behavior. People can
discuss beliefs, or simulate behaviors based upon beliefs, or have internal dialogue about
beliefs as well as enact behaviors in social situations that rely upon beliefs. All of these
behaviors are not necessarily similar in terms of physical representation, but they all
share processes of ToM and Theory Theory that contribute to social behaviors.

Is Downregulation of Theory of Mind Possible?
Another behavior that may share similar processes to ToM is downregulation.
Downregulation is an inhibition of neurons (due to refractory period, or due to blockers
in the synapse, or other various reasons; Chang and Grace, 2013). When neurons are
downregulated, activity in an area is suppressed relative to an uninhibited, upregulated
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area. Downregulation in attention areas correlate with meditation or resting behavior (as
measured by EEG theta activity; Klimesch, 1999). Downregulation can also appear as a
covariant of depression or fatigue (Hegerl & Ulke, 2016). A number of studies have
shown that ToM is a passive mental process and is most identifiable during situations
where there is high uncertainty in a social choice. However, questions regarding whether
or not downregulating ToM in a social choice is possible remain unanswered (Brown &
Brune, 2012; Ciao & Kunreuther, 2015; Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013; Hein &
Knight, 2008; Kagel & McGee, 2014; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011; Van Lange et al., 2013).
One possible way to test the downregulation of ToM is to use social strategies as a
mediator. Social strategies are interesting because ToM is required to create a strategy but
ToM is not necessarily needed to execute a strategy. Take for example the game of
American football. A team begins preparing for a game by studying previous games,
trying to understand how the opponent team positions their players to execute a play.
This preparation is like mentalization – trying to determine the intentions of the other
team through previous games. Once preparation is complete, play formations are reduced
to pattern recognition and the intentions of the opponent do not need further
mentalization because recognition of play formations should recall the learned intentions.
Therefore, a player would not necessarily need to apply ToM again. In terms of recalling
previous information, is performing a behavior based on a set strategy with or without
ToM? If it is with ToM, then the neural activity within ToM related areas during pattern
recognition within a game should be similar to the neural activity during the installation
of the strategy. If it is without ToM, then the neural activity within ToM areas during
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pattern recognition within a game should be less than during the installation of the
strategy.
Social Dilemma games are often used to study strategies during social situations.
Previous work on strategy usage utilized the social dilemma game The Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) to investigate optimal strategies. PD has been used to study ToM from a
behavioral and also a neural perspective (see reviews: Babiloni & Astolfi 2014;
Carrington & Bailey, 2009). In the PD, two players are told that they have been arrested
for a small criminal charge. They are interrogated in separate rooms about a larger
criminal charge. Each player was given the opportunity to testify against the other in
exchange for the possibility of immunity from prosecution. Each player also has the
option to stay silent, which guarantees some jail time. If both players stay silent (aka
cooperate), then both players serve small jail sentences. If both players testify (aka
defect), then both players serve large jail sentences. If one player testifies and the other
player stays silent, then the testifier earns immunity from prosecution and goes free while
the player who stayed silent earns a maximum sentence for the larger crime. In a
laboratory setting, multiple iterations of PD are presented to participants, where the rules
of the game are generally to “outscore” an opponent player, which can be quantified
either in fewest jail time served or associated point values to the four different PD choice
outcomes.
PD is a Nash equilibrium game in which a player will not change their behavior
of choice unless there is an advantage to changing their behavior (Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981). For PD, it is disadvantageous to switch away from a choice of cooperation, as
switching away from cooperation may incur greater short term gains but will ultimately
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diminish in returns over time due to the actions of the partner you are playing against
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
In an iterated PD, a participant can develop a “sense” about how the opponent may
choose on a given trial (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013;
Duffy & Smith, 2014; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Lissek et al., 2008; Pothos et al., 2011;
Rilling & Sanfey, 2011; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey, 2007; Soutschek, Sauter, &
Schubert, 2015).
PD is not necessarily studied using only one choice. Multiple iterations are
recorded in a single experimental session in many different studies (see review: Van
Lange et al., 2012). Multiple iterations create a choice history, or pattern that a player
with ToM could identify in their opponent and then generate a strategy to optimize their
own outcomes appropriately.
One of the first documented uses of a PD strategy is the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). TFT is a simple strategy where whatever the last choice
Player B made; Player A will make the same choice in the next iteration. This strategy
tended to promote mutual cooperation choices and quickly minimized losses when a
partner would switch from cooperation. People who used TFT in some way tended to
increase their outcomes when compared to other players who did not use TFT (Axelrod
& Hamilton, 1981; Rilling & Sanfay, 2011).
Another well-studied strategy is called Win-Stay/Lose-Switch (WSLS; Nowak &
Sigmund, 1993). This strategy relies upon the outcomes based upon the different
combinations of choices from Player A and Player B. In PD, for example, there are four
possible outcomes:
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1) If both Player A and Player B choose to cooperate, this generally results in 3
points for each player; this outcome is the “Reward” outcome (or R).
2) If both Player A and Player B choose to defect, this generally results in 1 point
for each player; this is the “Punishment” (P) outcome.
3) If Player A chooses to defect and Player B chooses to cooperate, this generally
results in 5 points for Player A and 0 points for Player B; this is the
“Temptation” (T) outcome for Player A
4) In the same scenario, as mentioned in example 3, Player B demonstrates the
“Sucker” (S) outcome; resulting in 0 points for Player A and 5 points for
player B?.
WSLS scoring tries to optimize the ability to be in one of the two high-scoring
outcomes (Reward or Temptation). A player does this by staying with a choice on the
following iteration if that choice earned an R or T outcome in the current iteration. In
contrast, a player can also switch from a choice on the following iteration if the current
choice earned a P or S outcome. For example, if Player A chooses to cooperate and earns
the R outcome, then using WSLS strategy would suggest Player A to choose to cooperate
for the next choice; however, if Player A chooses to cooperate and earns the S outcome,
then WSLS would suggest Player A to switch their choice next iteration for defect. In the
2011 Rilling & Sanfay study, WSLS was shown to outperform TFT since WSLS has the
ability to “forgive” defection choices by switching from a Punishment outcome and
risking a Sucker outcome (TFT strategists would continue to perform defection in the
face of a Punishment outcome until the partner was the person to risk a Sucker outcome).
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This change was enough to engender more partner cooperation behavior, leading to more
Temptation and Reward outcomes.
Adapting any of these strategies to a social dilemma game have clear behavioral
scoring benefits but the neural activity based around these strategies remains unclear. If a
person uses a strategy, does this downregulate ToM areas like the rTPJ because a strategy
is suppressing the need to understand the intentions of the opponent? Or does using a
strategy engage rTPJ because strategies are formed from belief updating and ToM and
should therefore engage ToM areas?
Why is it important to investigate downregulation of ToM in the first place? From
a basic research perspective, neural investigations into ToM have been inconclusive
simply because it is difficult to design equivalent tasks that can control for ToM. For
example, in experiments using PD, there is no reported control task for PD. Rather, PD is
usually presented with different task modifications such as people playing PD against
humans or against computer simulations (Rilling et al., 2004; Fukui et al., 2006; Haruno
& Kawato, 2009). Using task modification, there can only be relative increases and
decreases in ToM activity. Relative increases and decreases in activity are informative
but not clear -- there are so many different ToM tasks other than PD, activity related to
each task may simply be different due to the task itself; and some tasks may engage ToM
more than others. This is where discovering a way to downregulate ToM during ToM
tasks becomes a beneficial asset in ToM research. Understanding ways to control ToM
activity could provide a better basis for more complex ToM investigations, and being
able to consistently downregulate ToM across any ToM task would be of methodological
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importance. The main research goal in this study was to investigate whether participants
could downregulate neural activity in ToM areas due to strategy usage during PD.

The Neuroscience of Theory of Mind, The Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Strategy Usage
Two areas of the brain widely studied in relation to ToM and strategy usage
during social dilemma games: the prefrontal areas (medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal
cortex, lateral frontal cortex, cingulate cortex) and the inferior parietal areas (posterior
superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction; see review: Carrington & Bailey,
2009). In addition, a number of scholars have researched subcortical structures (e.g.,
amygdala, insula, hippocampus, fusiform gyrus, supplementary motor area, cerebellum);
however, the existing literature emphasizes prefrontal and inferior parietal areas for ToM
activity. Prefrontal areas are associated with social cognitive processes (i.e., decision
making and reasoning), and inferior parietal areas are associated with mentalization
(mental state processing, false belief processing, abstraction related to goals or
intentions). In simpler terms, the frontal areas are involved with ToM as it relates to the
“self” (where “self” is a person in a present moment) and the parietal areas are involved
with Theory of Mind as it relates to the “other” (where “other” can be anything that is not
a person in a present moment). The 2009 review by Carrington & Bailey proposed ToM
involves both prefrontal and inferior parietal areas, and it is unlikely these areas are
working independently.
Neural studies on PD have relied primarily on the neural activity of cooperation
or defection and demonstrated that differences in choice are related to
electroencephalographic alpha power, which is a measure of areas of neurons oscillating
between 8-12 Hz. The implications of alpha synchrony in relation to behavior has been
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researched in many areas. For example, greater alpha synchrony in inferior parietal areas
(e.g., greater amount of neurons oscillating within the alpha bandwidth) is related to
cooperative choices, whereas greater alpha desynchrony in frontal areas is related to
defection choices. (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013; Duffy
& Smith, 2014; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Lissek et al., 2008; Pothos et al., 2011; Rilling
& Sanfey, 2011; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey, 2007; Soutschek, Sauter, & Schubert, 2015).
Some fMRI studies using the PD paradigm have shown differences in blood-oxygen level
dependency (BOLD) activity during cooperation or defection. BOLD activity is a
measurement of the hemodynamic response in the brain related to how neural areas
utilize oxygen during a task. In this case, when compared to a baseline resting state,
greater BOLD activity in frontal areas is attributed to increases in defection choices,
whereas BOLD activity in inferior parietal areas positively correlates with the increasing
complexity of ToM scenarios (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011).
There is limited research investigating strategy usage on a neural level. One study
demonstrated TFT choices have seemingly more alpha synchronous than non-TFT
choices, however, this study failed to define TFT as a strategy, but instead defined TFT
as a choice after a Sucker or Temptation outcome (Haruno & Kawato, 2009). There is a
key discrepancy between utilizing TFT as a framework of strategic choice and choosing a
“TFT response”. Choosing a response that just so happens to be a TFT response does not
indicate a person understands what the TFT strategy is and how to apply the strategy at
all times. Understanding the value of a strategy and being able to apply a strategy may
result in different neural activity than previously reported in Haruno & Kawato’s 2009
study. Even less research exists for WSLS strategy: Forder & Dyson (2016) investigated
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WSLS but in a different game and WSLS behavior was observed post-hoc (similarly to
Haruno & Kawato, 2009).

Personality and Social Dilemma
Cooperative behavior may not necessarily be completely related to strategic
gameplay. Hokanson et al (1979, 1980) revealed people with depression tended to
cooperate less often -- and severity in depression had a strong negative correlation with
cooperative behavior. Dawes (1980) suggested a supplemental theory: people who are
increasingly altruistic may have strong positive correlation with cooperative behavior,
irrespective of strategic advantage in social dilemmas. Capraro (2013) further theorizes
cooperation is a function of human nature and may be related to why cooperative
behavior is selected in the face of a more exploitative strategy. Batson & Moran (1999)
tested this altruism theory by using PD and informing participants their opponent would
actually lose money. Participants cooperated more often than expected, seemingly due to
empathy. These theories and results suggest assessing depression and altruism as
potential covariates of strategy.

The Possible Roles of Strategy Usage During Social Dilemmas
Given the strong definitions for strategies like TFT and WSLS, the behavioral
advantages of abiding by strategies during social dilemma games, and the inconclusive
findings of whether behavior using quantified strategy is neurally different from behavior
using non-quantified strategy, the following study aims to address several questions:
1) Is there different neural activity between people who do and do not use strategies
during PD? Previous research from Haruno & Kawato (2009) is unclear as to
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whether choices that just-so-happen to align with a strategy is the same as
learning and applying a strategy. If differences are discovered, then the processes
of ToM are perhaps more complex than previously suggested.
2) Are there neural differences between different strategies (e.g. TFT versus WSLS)
during PD? To date, the majority of strategy-focused neural investigations use
only TFT as strategic behavior. Differences between TFT and other strategies like
WSLS could help determine whether certain strategies are more demanding of
ToM-related areas or perhaps other cognition areas.
3) Can ToM activity be downregulated? Using strategies to downregulate ToM
related neural activity would contribute to the idea that ToM can be a more
dynamic process than currently thought. If strategies help diminish ToM activity,
then perhaps strategy usage defers to other cognitive processes not primarily
related to ToM (e.g. executive function).
4) Can other psychological factors explain findings related to strategy usage?
Strategies exhibit more cooperative behavior than choosing without a specific
strategy. Altruistic behavior correlates with more cooperative behavior while
factors of depression correlate with less cooperative behavior during social
dilemma games. So it is possible that findings related to strategy group
participants versus control participants could also be described by altruistic
participants or people with depression.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS

Participants
The participants were 73 adults between the ages of 18 and 30. All participants
were initially randomly assigned to either the control group or the strategy training group.
If a participant revealed they were familiar with social dilemma strategies, that
participant was reassigned to the strategy group in order to avoid having control group
participants who knew of TFT or WSLS prior to the experiment. All participants were
right handed as determined by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Veale, 2014), in
order to control for neural laterality differences between left and right handed people.
Participants were compensated $5 per 15 mins of participation (~$15 per participant).
Power analysis strictly for a behavioral study (irrespective of any neural factors)
indicated 32 total participants (1 – β ≥ .80). However, when including neural factors, the
number of participants necessary to satisfy the channels of interest and the trial-halves
would increase to 128 participants. Data collection was stopped at 73 participants after
IRB protocol expiration.
There were several layers of data quality thresholds all participants needed to
meet in order for their data to be usable in the study. First was whether EEG data were
high quality (as per the data preprocessing section). Sixteen participants were disqualified
for poor EEG data quality. Second was exhibiting quantifiable strategic behavior (either
TFT or WSLS) throughout the experiment as described in the data preprocessing section.
Five participants who were trained in strategy were disqualified for not performing
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strategy above threshold. Similarly, in the control group, 8 participants were disqualified
for performing strategic behavior above threshold, whether they reported knowing a
strategy or not. Thirteen additional participants were excluded for admitting to either
knowing a strategy while in the control group or not remembering the strategy training
while in the strategy group. Subsequently, 31 participants (15 males) satisfied the
requirements for the study. Due to such a low sample size when analyzing TFT or WSLS
separately from each other, the decision was made to combine both groups into one
“strategy usage” group of 16 participants. Although the threshold to satisfy the power
analysis was low, Haruno & Kawato’s 2009 study showed neural evidence related to
ToM and TFT usage using 23 participants (11 TFT participants). Furthermore, due to
insufficient sample size, hypothesis 2 of this study, whether there are neural differences
between TFT and WSLS, became impossible to answer with any significant certainty.
However, hypotheses 1 and 3 (whether strategy usage differs from participants who do
not use a defined strategy and whether strategy usage downregulates alpha desynchrony,
respectively), were both still viable to analyze as both of these hypotheses are based
around strategy usage in general, and not specific to either TFT or WSLS.

Materials
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory – Short Form. The Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory - Short Form (EHI-SF; Veale, 2013) consists of four items which are rated on a
5-point Likert scale. The items ask participants whether they perform a task with their left
hand (1) or their right hand (5). Ratings were then summed across the items. Lefthandedness on this scale was represented by scores less than or equal to 8. Right
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handedness was represented by scores greater than or equal to 16. Scores of 9-15
represent mixed-handedness. To control for potential laterality related to ToM analyzed
in the rTPJ, participants in this study were right handed only.

Personality Tests. A potentially significant result in favor of the strategy group
differing from the control group may possibly be a byproduct of a personality trait. For
example, someone who was prone to cooperate more often that defect may explain
strategic behavior that tries to maximize the likelihood of mutual cooperation and
therefore would naturally adhere to a TFT or WSLS strategy. Similarly, ToM was
implicated as a possible reason why strategy formation occurs, someone with aboveaverage ToM may naturally adhere to strategies that require mentalizing the opponent.
Previous research has also implicated depression and suicidality to correlate with greater
performance in social dilemma games than average (Hokanson et al., 1980). In order to
be able to explain strategy usage as a correlate of personality (or not), the following tests
were administered.
The Eyes Test. The Eyes Test (EYES) is a 36-question task wherein participants
are shown a set of eyes for each quest and are asked to select one of four terms that best
describes the intention of the person (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001; Baron-Cohen et al, 1997).
The intentions terms presented vary between different descriptors (i.e. “flirtatious” and
“skeptical”). The scores range from 0 to 36 with a mean of 26 (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001).
Self Report Altruism Scale. The Self-Report Altruism Scale (SRAS) is a 20-item
Likert scale survey where participants are instructed to rate the frequency of engaging in
altruistic behaviors (i.e. I have given directions to a stranger and I have given money to a
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charity) using categories ‘Never’, ‘Once’, ‘More Than Once’, ‘Often’ and ‘Very Often’
(Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981). The scores range from 20 to 100 with a mean of
55.4 (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981).
Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is a 21-item
survey where participants select statements that they most identify with (i.e. I feel sad, I
do not feel guilty, etc; Beck et al, 1961). Scores can range from 0 to 63. Scores above 19
indicate a person experiencing depression while scores below 11 indicate a typically
healthy person.
Scale for Suicide Ideation. The Scale for Suicide Ideation (SSI) is a 16-item
survey where participants select how much they identify with a given statement (i.e.
“Wish to die: None”, “Wish to die: weak”, “Wish to die: moderate to strong”; Beck et al,
1979). Scores below 7 would indicate low suicide ideation whereas scores above 14
would indicate high suicide ideation.
EEG Apparatus
Electrophysiological data were recorded directly from the scalp via gold-plated
silver electrodes using the 14-channel Emotiv EPOC mobile EEG cap. The EEG data
were recorded onto a Windows PC via native Emotive software. The 14 electrodes were
placed over brain regions across the entire scalp (AF3, F7, F3, FC5, T7, P7, O1, O2, P8,
T8, FC6, F4, F8, and AF4) and used CMS/DRL reference. Samples were collected at a
rate of 128 per second (2048 Hz internal). Scalp impedance was below 10kΩ at recording
onset. The felt scalp contacts for each electrode were rewetted with saline solution during
the rest breaks.
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Procedures
Strategy Training. Participants in the strategy training group were exposed to
both TFT and WSLS strategies, counterbalanced across all participants (half receiving
TFT instructions first). Participants were instructed to use either of the strategies they
were trained on or a different strategy they wish to develop on their own, including no
strategy whatsoever. Specifically, they will be told, “You may choose to use any strategy,
even strategies that were not presented in this training. Choosing any strategy will have
no consequence.” The purpose for these instructions were to give education on a strategy
but not force a participant into a specific behavior.
Participants in the control group were exposed to reading two course syllabi in
place of strategy instructions. The amount of words presented were the same amount as
the words presented in the strategy instructions, as to match any fatigue effects brought
on by the strategy training instructions.
Prisoner’s Dilemma PD was presented in a training prior to the experiment
beginning, where participants were presented with the dilemma in story form and then
shown a payoff matrix for outcomes depending on choices. During this training,
participants were either informed they were to outscore the other participant only or to
both outscore the other participant and also score as many points as a team. Participants
were initially presented with a payoff matrix and were instructed to choose between
cooperation (indicated by button press “1”) or defection (indicated by button press “0”).
After choosing, participants waited for their partner (actually a computer simulation) to
choose. Once both answers were logged, an outcome screen was presented and displayed
the scores for that trial. No running total was displayed in order for participants in the
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strategy group to rely on a trial-to-trial strategy and not on a global strategy (for example,
if a participant was up in points, there was no incentive to cooperate anymore). After the
outcome screen was presented, the payoff matrix was presented afterward to start a new
iteration of the dilemma. Participants played through 40 iterations of PD, although
participants were told the trials were randomly determined and could end at any length.
There were three different computer-controlled personalities participants were
playing against: a random choice personality (50% cooperation), a cooperative
personality (75% cooperation), and a competitive personality (25% cooperation). Choices
within personality were pseudorandomized, where each personality type received 4
different choice patterns. Then, all possible permutations of the pseudorandomized
personality types were combined where one personality type represented the first 20
choices and a second personality type represented the last 20 choices. This was to help
avoid any confounds related to order effects related to choice or personality order.
Different personalities were used to test if participants changed strategies based on the
choices of their opponent, as opposed to an opponent with one strategy which may be
more inclined to engender a particular strategy from the participant.
In addition, to test for adaptive measures of Theory of Mind (i.e. to test how
quickly participants switched from using their strategy to possibly a different strategy)
the computer was programmed to perform a personality switch after twenty choices
where the participant was not aware of the switch. Participants played against 50%
cooperation personality first and then switched to 75% cooperation personality similar to
the design of Haruno & Kawato’s 2009 study. This also further emphasizes that a

19
participant’s strategy at the beginning of the experiment may require ToM halfway
through the experiment when presented with a different cooperation rate.

Experiment Presentation
Participants filled out an IRB consent and took EYES, SRAS, BDI, and SSI on a
computer. Both groups of participants were told they were playing against a person who
had already played the game and the object was to outscore the other person. The amount
of trials remained undisclosed to the participant, but was informed of the experiment
duration. The EEG experiment itself takes up to 30 mins (there was a fixed amount of 40
trials; estimated session recording time was 10-15mins depending on participant
durations during choice).
In order to observe a target EEG signal without overlapping signals from
cognitive tasks like reading or reacting to the PD score, sufficient time between events
must occur. Since response and subsequent activity to an event may last 2000ms per
event, all events require at least 2000ms of time from the start of the event to the
beginning of the next event. Some events are even longer. For example, the time after the
outcome presentation and before the next choice may contain ToM and strategy usage as
a participant decides how to choose for the next trial. To capture this window, the time is
extended to 6000ms. Transitions between choice and outcome presentation have a 500ms
duration, to create a buffer between events and also to serve as a short baseline for the
outcome event. Overall, one trial consists of the following presentation order: 6000ms of
open eyes, fixed cross, 2000ms of choice, 500ms of open eyes, fixed cross, and 2000ms
of outcome presentation (8.5s per trial).
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Participants began the entire experiment with a 60s open eyes fixed cross rest to
establish a resting state baseline and then played 40 iterations of PD, 20 for one
personality and 20 for a different personality. Participants were unaware of the
personality switch. The experiment ended with a 60s fixed cross open eyes rest, used as
part of the resting state baseline. Total experiment time was approximately one hour per
participant.

Data Preprocessing
Data were preprocessed through EEGLab via MATLAB. Bandpass filters were
set to 0.05-59Hz. EEG activity was re-referenced to average activity reference. EEG
spectral power density processing was divided into theta (4-7.99Hz), alpha (8-11.99Hz),
and beta (12-24Hz). ERP activity was averaged across trials for each participant.

Behavioral Outcomes
There were four possible outcomes for each trial: 1. When both players
cooperated, referred to as “reward outcome” both received an “R”; 2. When both players
defected, referred to as “punishment outcome” both received a“P”; 3. When one player
defected and the opponent cooperated the defector earned the “temptation outcome” or
“T” while the cooperator earned the “sucker outcome” or “S”. TFT users choose what the
opponent chose last. For example, the probability of choosing to cooperate after an
opponent cooperates should be 100% while the probability of choosing to cooperate after
an opponent defects should be 0%. We can write this probability in statistical notation
with respect to all four outcomes:
TFT: p(T,R,P,S) = (1,1,0,0)
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We can write a similar probability notation for WSLS users based off of
outcomes:
WSLS: p(T,R,P,S) = (0,1,1,0)
However, we cannot expect participants to choose at these idealistic rates. In
previous studies of these strategies, participants were more inclined to choose by these
strategies about 70% of the time (Kummerli et al., 2007). Thus, if a participant was
choosing either strategy in one of these forms, then that particular user can be defined as
a TFT/WSLS user:
TFT: p(T,R,P,S) = (0.7,0.7,0.3,0.3)
WSLS: p(T,R,P,S) = (0.3,0.7,0.7,0.3)

ToM Differences Between Groups Analysis
The first aim was to determine whether people using TFT/WSLS in PD differed
neurally from people who did not use these strategies. We conducted an analysis of
group, choices, and outcomes using the neural data as the dependent variable.
Participants were classified in three different ways: 1. group assignment (trained strategy
vs. control); 2. cooperation and defection choices, per Haruno & Kawato (2009); 3.
participant outcomes (T, R, P, or S as outlined in the behavioral outcomes section), since
participant reactions to outcomes would be an event that may have active ToM. This
leads to a mixed model 2 (group: trained strategy or control) x 2 (choice: cooperate or
defect) x 4 (outcome: T, R, P, or S) ANOVA for each channel. Eight channels (AF3,
AF4, F3, F4, F7, F8, P7, P8) were selected as channels of interest for their location near
areas related to previous Theory of Mind and social dilemma tasks (Babiloni & Astolfi,
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2014; Carrington & Bailey, 2009). Alpha activity (8-12Hz) was used to indicate whether
there was greater “activity”, aka alpha desynchrony, in a given channel when compared
to baseline resting state. The more desynchronous or dissimilar the alpha signal was for a
task when compared to baseline resting state was an indication of increased usage about a
given channel. Previous research has indicated alpha desynchrony as a measure of
whether brain activity related to ToM or during social dilemma tasks was significant
(Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013; Duffy & Smith, 2014;
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Lissek et al., 2008; Pothos et al., 2011; Rilling & Sanfey,
2011; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey, 2007; Soutschek, Sauter, & Schubert, 2015). Note that
alpha desynchrony was recorded throughout the experiment but only specific time
windows are selected, in which alpha desynchrony was averaged throughout the selected
time window. For this aim, the 1000ms after choice was averaged.
The second aim was to determine whether there were neural differences between
TFT and WSLS. A channel-wise, mixed model 2x2x4 ANOVA was performed, except
participants were divided into a TFT user group and a WSLS user group. If WSLS was
truly more economically driven, then greater left lateralized channel alpha desynchrony
should be shown for WSLS users than TFT users, as indicated by Declerck, Boone, &
Emonds 2013 review. However, as indicated in the participants section, there were not
enough participants to allow for this analysis.
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Downregulation of ToM Analysis
The third aim was to determine whether the strategy group downregulated ToM
alpha desynchrony relative to the control group. A multiple level split-half analysis was
used. The first half of choices within one personality were compared to the second half of
choices within the same personality. If downregulation occurred, this should be indicated
by lesser alpha desynchrony in the second half than in the first, particularly right
lateralized areas, and specifically in parietal areas. Furthermore, if downregulation
occurred, then there should be a group x half interaction: the trained strategy group
should show no neural differences from the control group during the first half of trials,
but in the second half of trials the control group should show greater alpha desynchrony
than the trained strategy group. This would indicate ToM downregulation in the trained
strategy group. However, it was possible that different opponent choices affect ToMrelated alpha desynchrony differently. Therefore, opponent choice was a level of analysis
in order to control for any potential opponent choice effects. This resulted in a mixed
model 2 (group) x 2 (personality half: first 10 trials vs last 10 trials within computer
personality) x 2 (opponent choice: cooperation vs defection) ANOVA for each channel.
The same eight EEG channels of interest from the ToM between-group analysis were
selected for the same reasons as related to ToM activity. Alpha desynchrony was also the
measure of event-related brain activity for this analysis -- the same as the ToM betweengroup analysis. 500ms prior to choice presentation was targeted and alpha desynchrony
was averaged across this time window.
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Altruism and Theory of Mind Personality Trait Analysis
To test whether personality on any of these measures played a role, an initial
linear regression was performed on personality measure scores and percent adherence to
TFT/WSLS. If there was a positive correlation between personality measures and strategy
adherence, then the neural differences explained in terms of strategy could also be
explained through personality. If there was no correlation, this does not immediately rule
out personality as a possible factor of ToM. Dividing groups by personality test means
(e.g. above average and below average) and using these personality groups in statistical
analyses as opposed to using strategy and control groups would provide evidence for
differences in personality. The previously stated analyses that include group as a level of
analysis would all be the same except with respect to personality score splits. If there are
differences due to personality, then those differences should appear when groups are
separated by personality as opposed to strategy or control. However, if no group
differences are found with respect to personality scores, then ToM and strategy usage
may not be impacted by personality.

Statistical Analysis
Since there was low power and small sample size in this analysis, a Bayesian
analysis may help establish further statistical evidence throughout analyses in this study.
Similar to frequentist statistics, Bayesian statistics also have a general threshold for
significance, where a Bayes Factor (Cauchy prior = 0.707) greater than 3, or BF10 > 3
(pprob > 75%) would be considered in support of the alternative hypothesis. However,
this does not mean Bayes Factors between 1 and 3 are not meaningful -- these results also
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are in support of the alternative hypothesis, but perhaps not at the 75% posterior
probability rate. For the most conservative methods, BFs above 3 will be discussed as
“significant” with moderate (>3) or strong (>10) support for the alternative hypothesis;
for less conservative Bayesian statistical interpretations, any BF above 1 should be
considered in support of the alternative hypothesis since there is a greater-than-chance
probability of recurrence. So while a BF10 = 2 is not considered “significant” in the eyes
of general statistical thresholding, the posterior probability of 66.67% is rather
meaningful, as the likelihood of recurrence would be greater than the null hypothesis of
no differences in likelihood (BF10 = 1).
Multiple analytic techniques are used in this study in order to account for both
traditional significance (frequentist, “p-value” statistics) and the probability distribution
of an event generating similar EEG activity in a reproduction or replication of these
methods (Bayesian statistics). For example, it may be possible to achieve a significant
difference (p<0.05) in neural activity between groups, but the likelihood of recurrence
may be low (BF10 ≈ 1, posterior probability ≈ 50%; in other words, only a coin-flip
chance of achieving the same result, or rather no difference in the null Bayesian
hypothesis). Thus, a statistic may be significant but unlikely to occur with frequency
beyond this study. And since sample sizes are small, BF can provide support similar to
effect size with regards to replication and reproducibility.
All statistical analyses were performed in JASP.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Behavioral Strategy Analysis
The three recorded and analyzed behavioral measures were rate of cooperation,
choice response time (RT), and points. Differences are expected in all three of these
measures as established by previous research (Kummerli et al., 2007).
For cooperation rate, there was a group main effect, where the trained strategy
group was more cooperative than the control group (Figure 3.1; F(1,29)=4.478, p<0.043,
η =0.134). No other statistical comparisons were significant. This was evident in previous
2
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works (Kummerli et al., 2007; Papageorgiou et al., 2013; Press & Dyson, 2012; Stewart
& Plotkin, 2013).
Figure 3.1

Behavioral data. Group differences for cooperation rate (left; F(1,29)=4.478, p<0.043, η =0.134).
Response time (ms) differences from first half to second half of the experiment (right;
F(1,29)=34.46, p<0.001, η2p=0.543). All error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
2
p
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For RT, there was a main effect of half, where participants were faster in the
second half than the first (Figure 3.1; F(1,29)=34.46, p<0.001, η2p=0.543). No other
comparisons were significant. This would be an intuitive finding (i.e. practice effects
would suggest participants would become faster at performing a task as a task iterates
over time).

Neural Strategy Analysis
ToM Activity Between Groups. One question was whether there was a
difference between groups during PD. To test for ToM, the cooperation rate differed in
the first half of trials versus the second half of trials. If there was a noticeable change in
behavior, this should reflect in ToM areas of the brain and there should be group
differences about these areas, where the control group should have greater alpha
desynchrony relative to the strategy group.
The main effect of half was significant, favoring greater alpha desynchrony
during the second half than the first (F(1,29)=4.478, p<0.05, η2p=0.134) although this
was an extremely weak posterior probability (BF10 = 0.676, pprob = 40.3%). The group
✕ half interaction was also significant (F(1,29)=15.16, p<0.001, η2p=0.343), indicating
groups performed equally during the first half, while the second half showed greater
alpha desynchrony for the control group than for the strategy group, albeit with weak
posterior probability (t(29) = 2.17, p<0.05, d=0.78, BF10 = 1.534, pprob = 60.5%).
Finally, a group x half x channel was conducted, which initially revealed AF3,
AF4, F8, and P8 as showing values in accordance with the hypothesis. Another group x
half x channel rmANOVA was conducted with only these channels, again revealing a

28
significant two-way group x half interaction (F(1,29)=4.419, p<0.05, η p=0.126), as well
2

as a significant three-way group x half x channel interaction (F(3,87)=3.216, p<0.05,
η2p=0.100). The post-hoc analyses show no differences between groups in the first half,
but differences between groups in the second half for only AF3 (t(29)=2.193, p<0.05,
d=.79) and P8 (t(29)=2.828, p<0.05, d=.66); as depicted in Figure 3.2, only AF3 showed
a strong posterior probability (BF10 = 5.281, pprob = 84.07%) whereas P8 was far weaker
in supporting posterior probability (BF10 = 1.686, pprob = 62.77%).
Given this evidence, there was seemingly a non-zero chance for baseline
differences to occur, with evidence corroborated from a ToM-related channel in P8 as
well as other channels across the fronto-parietal network. This seems to indicate
differences in baseline alpha desynchrony between groups are generated before choices
are made -- or rather, those using strategy differ behaviorally and neurally from those not
using strategy. Furthermore, there was evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis in
regard to the trial halves generating neural differences -- a possible implicit ToM test.
This too was more prevalent in the P8 channel during the second half when compared to
the first half; possibly indicating a sensitivity for P8 (and also AF3) in ToM detection
without the introduction of an explicit agent or confederate as was done in previous
studies (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Haruno & Kawato, 2009).
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Figure 3.2

Alpha desynchrony during the first 1000ms of choice for group (control, strategy),
channel (AF3, P8), and experiment half (first half, second half). There was a significant
group x half x channel interaction (F(3,87)=3.216, p<0.05, η2p=0.100), where the second
experiment half indicates greater alpha desynchrony for the control group in AF3
(t(29)=2.193, p<0.05, d=.79, BF10 = 5.281, pprob = 84.07%) and P8 (t(29)=2.828,
p<0.05, d=.66, BF10 = 1.686, pprob = 62.77%).
Overall, the halves do indicate changes in alpha desynchrony and these analyses
use the split halves as a factor in all subsequent rmANOVA, but in some cases it was
negligible (during the first half of choices) whereas other cases, the group differences are
prominent (during the second half of choices).
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Downregulation of ToM. Another question was whether ToM could be
downregulated using strategy. After participants see the outcome screen, ToM should be
engaged when deliberating what to choose in the next trial. To take into account outcome,
the opponent responses are divided between cooperation or defection on the previous
trial.
In P8, a significant main effect of group was found (F(1,29)=4.478, p<0.05,
η2p=0.134), where the control group showed greater alpha desynchrony overall than the
strategy group. A significant two-way group x outcome interaction (F(1,29)=3.826,
p<0.05, η2p=0.177) indicated no differences in alpha desynchrony during opponent
cooperation choices, but greater alpha desynchrony for opponent defection in the control
group than in the strategy group (Figure 3.3; t(29)=2.407, p<0.05, d=.87, BF10 = 2.77,
pprob = 73.47%). In all other channels, no significant differences were found.
Since the results implicate the control group having greater alpha desynchrony
than the strategy group, this finding would indicate some sort of downregulation of ToM
processing for the strategy group -- and if P8 or the areas near rTPJ are truly related to
ToM, then it is important to understand the group differences that may elicit a baseline
alpha desynchrony change.
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Figure 3.3

Alpha desynchrony in channel P8, 500ms prior to choice for group (control, strategy) and
outcome (opponent cooperation, opponent defection). There is a significant group ✕
outcome interaction (F(1,29)=3.826, p<0.05, η2p=0.177) indicating the control group
exhibited greater alpha desynchrony than the strategy group when the opponent defected
on the previous trial (t(29)=2.407, p<0.05, d=.87, BF10 = 2.77, pprob = 73.47%).
Personality Trait and ToM Activity Analysis. It was possible that trait-level
effects could explain the differences between groups in these analyses. Since all
participants took several different personality inventories, significant correlations
between personality traits and ToM-related alpha desynchrony could perhaps explain the
significant neural findings as a moderator.
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Using the same analyses as before, there were no significant group differences
when dividing groups based on any of these personality scales. This would indicate that
personality may have less to do with social dilemmas (or the neural processing of this
particular social dilemma) than previously thought (Hokanson et al., 1980; Papageorgiou
et al., 2013).
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

The main goal of this study was to investigate potential neural differences
between people trained in strategy versus people not trained in strategy during PD and
how these differences could influence ToM. Previous research from Haruno & Kawato
(2009) indicated a difference in posterior parietal activity (specifically about the rTPJ)
between people who used TFT in PD versus control group participants who did not use
TFT. The authors claim the difference in activity indicates a difference in ToM
processing. However, the definition of what TFT was in this study was narrow,
examining only Sucker or Temptation outcomes (i.e. when the opponent chose opposite
of what the player chose). Using the methodologies from Haruno & Kawato’s 2009 study
and expanding on the methods and analyses, the findings of the study herein sought to
clarify the role of strategy as it pertains to ToM in social dilemmas.
The first research question was based around group-level alpha desynchrony
differences in strategy usage. Specifically, we wanted to replicate the previous findings
of neural differences between people who chose by a learned strategy and extend the
prior findings by assessing whether there were significant differences among people who
did not choose according to the target strategies and those who were not exposed to
strategies (Haruno & Kawato, 2009). In Haruno & Kawato’s 2009 study, the authors
investigated TFT choices in PD where the participant and opponent make different
choices (either Temptation or Sucker outcomes). There were two different groups in
Haruno & Kawato’s (2009) study, a group that played against a TFT opponent and a
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group that played against a 70% cooperation opponent. To expand on the definition of
“strategy”, the methods presented in this paper examined TFT and WSLS strategies
together as a strategy group. Also, we included a control group of participants who did
not make choices based on either of these strategies. To expand on the outcomes when
groups were analyzed, opponent cooperation or defection choices were considered,
irrespective of what the participant selected. Finally, to expand on engaging ToM, we
programmed a change in the cooperation rate from the opponent halfway through the
experiment as opposed to having participants play against an opponent with a single
strategy like in Haruno & Kawato’s 2009 study. If a participant noticed the cooperation
rate change, ToM-related alpha desynchrony should increase. These method changes
made an argument for the implications of strategy (and not specifically one strategy) with
respect to rTPJ alpha desynchrony as well as broadening the types of responses
considered in the analysis.
The second research question concerned group differences related to
downregulation of ToM: in Haruno & Kawato’s 2009 study, the authors considered TFT
choices and the activity associated with these choices as evidence for greater ToM-related
activity compared to non-TFT choices. However, the window of analysis and criteria for
what was “strategic choice” are perhaps inconclusive. Haruno & Kawato analyzed rTPJ
activity during the choice event and assumed activity differences between groups were
due to ToM. Strategy usage can occur prior to choice and not necessarily at the choice
event. Therefore, analyzing the activity window before the choice event would make
more sense in terms of how people use strategies. Participants may be selecting choices
that would be aligned with TFT but have no concept of TFT as a strategy. Training a
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group of participants in TFT or WSLS strategies and using only participants who adhered
to either of these strategies was a selection criteria. Participants who did not know about
either TFT or WSLS and did not select by either TFT or WSLS pattern for the majority
of their choices were selected into the control group. This study focused on the alpha
desynchrony window prior to choice. The primary hypothesis was people in the strategy
group would have less alpha desynchrony in the rTPJ than people in the control group
because strategy usage may replace some of the reliance on opponent intention and
therefore decrease signal related to ToM.
Although not an aim, in order to present evidence for possible alternative
explanations for any group differences, personality tests were administered to participants
in order to divide groups based on personality tests scores as opposed to strategy training
and usage. Previous research has indicated some support for increased cooperative
behavior during PD correlating with increased agreeableness (Kagel & McGee, 2014;
Pothos et al., 2010). If some personality tests correlate with cooperation rates during PD,
it may be possible that the strategy group versus control group differences could also be
explained using personality tests related to ToM and strategy usage. However, if there
was no significant evidence to support personality as a factor that describes the group
differences in alpha desynchrony seen in this study, then perhaps strategy usage was not
correlated with some ToM-related personality traits.

ToM Differences Between Groups When Using Strategies
Alpha desynchrony between groups were not significantly different during the
first half of the task. This may reflect the novel reaction to the task and ToM alpha
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desynchrony for either group was the same. In the second half, there was a group
difference, in which the control group showed significantly increased alpha desynchrony
in AF3 and P8 compared to the strategy group. This increase in alpha desynchrony
suggested greater ToM-related processing for participants who did not learn and apply
either TFT or WSLS strategies to PD. Participants did recognize the change in
cooperation rate from the first half of the experiment to the second half, as established by
a significant main effect of experiment halves. This also means that since both groups
recognized this change and the strategy group kept applying TFT or WSLS behavior (true
based on participant exclusion criteria), then the only methodological difference between
groups would be related to the lack of strategy training and usage for the control group.
And we should expect people with ToM to mentalize, or mentally simulate what the
opponent was doing, when encountering a change in behavior (Rilling & Sanfay, 2011).
Thus, an increase in alpha desynchrony for channels AF3 and P8 in this paradigm was the
expected activity for someone who does not select by TFT or WSLS (Carrington &
Bailey, 2009; Rilling & Sanfay, 2011). If participants who choose by TFT or WSLS do
not exhibit increased alpha desynchrony like the control group, then strategy usage was a
factor of ToM differences. Unlike Haruno & Kawato’s (2009) study, a broader definition
of strategy was used in this study as well as a larger range of choices to analyze. Even
with less specificity than showcased in Haruno & Kawato’s study, the result of people
using quantifiable strategies differing from people who were not trained or using
quantifiable strategies was replicated. Furthermore, research using monkeys have also
indicated similar findings related to frontal activity and temporoparietal activity (Ong,
Madlon-Kay, & Platt, 2020). While monkeys played a social dilemma game, neuronal
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activity from the medial superior temporal sulcus (an area similar to the rTPJ in humans)
and the anterior cinguate cortex demonstrated increased recruitment when selecting
choices and reacting to outcomes. The researchers indicated that no monkeys were
performing TFT or WSLS and choice may have been more affected by how realistic the
opponent responses were compared to a computer. This would be similar to the findings
of the control group, where participants showed increased alpha desynchrony in AF3 and
P8 compared to the strategy group.

Group Differences When Downregulating ToM
The baseline alpha activity for the trained strategy group and the control group
were no different if the opponent chose to cooperate in the previous trial; but if the
opponent decided to defect, there was a greater alpha desynchrony in the channel P8 for
the control group than for the trained strategy group. This would suggest TFT/WSLS
processing of an opponent defection would be less ToM-engaging than if a person was
not trained with TFT/WSLS. This would be counter to the findings of Haruno &
Kawato’s (2009) study, which suggested strategy usage correlates with greater ToMrelated processing. Rather, it was perhaps more logical to believe the choice event
(regardless of strategic usage) engages the same amount of ToM while the processing
prior to choice was different and was a better indicator of ToM engagement.
Strategies are plans-of-action based on previous events and are used to act upon a
current event. Therefore, a strategic person would have to maintain strategic knowledge
prior to an action or event. Compare this to a person who considers each iteration of
choice independent from the last iteration. If a person bases a choice on no history, then
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generating a strategy for that particular event would be very difficult. Rather than
reacting strictly to the previous behavior, a player not trained in strategy could be
compensating for the lack of strategy by accessing experiences with previous people who
behaved in a specific way, and therefore exhibiting greater ToM-related neural activity
because of mentalization (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). However, it was also possible to
consider the reverse: that strategy somewhat inhibits, or downregulates, neural activity in
the right parietal area since there was no real need to further engage this area if a
strategy-trained player was no longer considering the intentions of the other opponent.

Personality Traits and ToM Differences
There were no differences in alpha desynchrony in any channel when participants
were divided by personality inventories. There was no consensus on the correlation of
personality trait and performance on PD, with few studies showing weak correlations
(Boone, Brabander, & Witteloostuijn, 1999; Declerck, Boone, & Emonds, 2013; Kagel &
McGee, 2014; Pothos et al., 2010; Radell et al., 2016; Van Lange et al., 2013). The
findings in this study showed no evidence of personality traits correlating with alpha
desynchrony in any channels of interest, even though this does raise questions about PD
and testing for ToM in general. If a person scores high on an altruism test and chooses to
not be altruistic in PD, this might not necessarily mean that person was never altruistic to
begin with. Rather, PD is a scenario where altruism is hard to fathom. In John Nash’s
1950 paper, Non-cooperative Games, he defines PD-like games as non-cooperative
games and continues to say cooperative motives in PD games are nested under the
umbrella of non-cooperative game dynamics. Based on Nash’s logic, choosing to play by
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the subset of rules over the larger set of rules would be impractical at best, and harmful to
the player at worst (due to cooperation being taken advantage of). For example, a
typically altruistic player may not be altruistic when the environment is overall noncooperative, and could easily exploit someone who plays more cooperatively. Likewise, a
player with greater ToM may not perform differently on PD than a player with lesser
ToM because engaging ToM was only a subset of the overall competition of the game -understanding the intentions of an opponent was not required or even possible during the
first choice, therefore ToM was a subset of choices and not represented in every choice.
PD in general does not necessarily require a person to understand an opponent’s
intentions, but only to outscore an opponent. Based on Nash’s theories, the point of using
ToM or altruistic ideas in PD would be as a strategy to outscore an opponent by
understanding the intentions of an opponent. And as the Nash Equilibrium states, unless
there was a benefit for changing strategy, there was no need to change strategy at all. In
this case, there was no need to include factors of altruism or ToM into a game where a
player can perform just as well (or better) using a strategy that does not require altruism
or ToM.

Limitations
Sample Size. Sample size was a large limiting factor in this study. While the
initial target of participants of 128 was potentially possible, the participant exclusion
criteria would have made collecting 128 participants much more difficult. The current
study reflected 73 recorded participants with only 30 being accepted into the analysis.
Assuming this 41% acceptance rate would have scaled, in order to find 128 accepted
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participants, potentially 320 participants would have been needed. Perhaps even more
limiting, 320 participants would have cost about $4800 to record and the budget for this
study was nowhere near that cost. Foreseeing such a large percentage of participants
failing out of the study was not necessarily by any design flaw of the study but rather the
tolerance of noise acceptable to establish the conclusions of the findings. It was
impossible to know whether a participant would or would not adhere to a strategy when
in the strategy group. While it was possible to know whether a participant was exposed to
TFT or WSLS prior to participating in the study, it was not known whether the
participant would have behaved in a TFT or WSLS manner until after the recording.
Even with the limitations of the sample size, the 2009 Haruno & Kawato study
included 32 participants and results within this current study replicated the significant
group differences found in Haruno & Kawato’s study. Also, the inclusion of Bayesian
statistics helps establish a likelihood of replication even with a small sample size.
Overlapping Cognitive Functions in Target Areas. One challenge associated
with the neural investigation of ToM was isolating the neural process from other
cognitive processes that could also account for the alpha desynchrony produced within
the same regions. Prefrontal activation was not specific to social cognitive processes;
rather this activation occurs during any cognitive processes. Similarly, parietal activation
was not specific to only ToM or reflecting on the other versus the self, but also relates to
attention. Research on ToM has relied primarily on using tasks in which an opponent
does or does not employ a ToM strategy. For example, in this current study, dynamic
cooperation rates halfway through experimental presentation was based on previous
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studies that have demonstrated how a person may interpret choices that are coming from
an opponent with ToM versus an opponent without ToM (Carrington & Bailey, 2011).
Further, Byom & Mutlu (2013) discovered that participants were able to discern
opponents with ToM and opponents without ToM via complexity in patterns. Less
complex choice patterns (i.e., two cooperation choices, one defection choice, repeated ad
infinitum) required less neural engagement of cortical areas associated with ToM to
respond whereas greater complexity in choice patterns did engage higher activity in ToM
cortical-related areas. Researchers then used the same paradigm in front of a non-human
robot and a humanoid robot. As the robots demonstrated higher social normative
behaviors unrelated to the scenario (e.g. eye contact, unnecessary movements thought to
be related to processing), activity in the same cortical regions related to ToM increased.
So, although it was impossible to eliminate or isolate ToM processes (like mentalization)
from more general processes (like attention), it was not impossible to view the relative
differences during situations where there was less ToM (like predictable choices and lack
of social normative behaviors) and more ToM (like complexity in choices and greater
social normative behaviors).
Alternative Strategies. In addition to TFT and WSLS, a newer strategy was
developed called the Zero Determinant Strategy (ZD), which was more computational
than TFT or WSLS (Press & Dyson, 2012; Stewart & Plotkins, 2012; Stewart & Plotkins,
2013). Rather than merely relying on previous behaviors or outcomes of a partner to
develop choices based on strategy, ZD has two rate multiply factors (one factor
controlling how cooperative/competitive a player wants to be; the other factor controlling
for how many points a player wants to guarantee for him/her) which generates a
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percentage of how often to cooperate in any given outcome. This strategy accounts for
TFT, where setting the rate multipliers to the least competitive value (e.g., “1”) will
output 100% cooperation choices after Temptation and Reward outcomes and 0%
cooperation choices after Punishment and Sucker outcomes. As the rate multipliers
increase, the percentages (particularly Temptation and Reward cooperation percentages)
begin to decrease. The perception of a mostly cooperative strategy capitalizes on
exploiting partner’s cooperative behavior.
Strategies like ZD are not easy for people to learn due to the complexity in the
math that leads to a choice. Easier strategies, like always-cooperate or always-defect, also
exist but the purpose of either may be less related to wanting to win in a non-cooperative
social dilemma and more related to apathy towards the dilemma entirely. Other strategies,
like early cooperation and then late defection, could also be used as a simple strategy,
albeit very basic and easily exploitable.
It was difficult to account for all the possible variations of strategies and whether
the spectrum of quantifiable strategies all downregulate ToM in PD, but the current work
within this study showcases TFT was not the only strategy that contributes to the
downregulation of ToM in PD. Adding WSLS into the strategy group still showed
significant results, so there was some support that favors other strategies showing
significant results under the same methodological conditions.

Conclusions
There was significant evidence that people using a quantifiable strategy during
PD have decreased neural activity relative to people who do not use a quantifiable
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strategy. This downregulation of neural activity occurs in the presence of a task where
ToM was engaged, as evident by the posterior parietal alpha desynchrony in people who
do not use a quantifiable strategy. This differs from previous findings that indicate
strategy usage increases activity in posterior parietal areas during PD (Haruno & Kawato,
2009). This was also novel from the perspective of when strategy usage can be observed - where a time window prior to choice can be analyzed for ToM-related neural activity as
opposed to the time window during choice. With all of these findings and discoveries
related to the relationship of strategy usage and ToM, the investigations into strategy
usage and how strategy was formed and utilized in the brain seems much more complex
than previously thought. Strategy has been tied to ToM because using a strategy requires
having some sort of knowledge of the behavioral tendencies of the opponent (Carrington
& Bailey, 2011; Haruno & Kawato, 2009). However, ToM was a social cognitive process
used when trying to theorize the actions or intentions of another person. If a person
already has a behavior determined by a strategy then there would be less need to theorize
the actions or intentions of another person. Therefore, seeing a downregulation of ToM
during strategy usage should be an expected response. Future studies would focus on how
long ToM is present during a social dilemma and if a person who develops a strategy
over time also downregulates ToM over time.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory – Short Form (Veale, 2013)
Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities or objects:
Writing:

Always Right

Usually Right

Both Equally

Usually Left

Always

Always Right

Usually Right

Both Equally

Usually Left

Always

Always Right

Usually Right

Both Equally

Usually Left

Always

Always Right

Usually Right

Both Equally

Usually Left

Always

Left
Throwing:
Left
Toothbrush:
Left
Spoon:
Left
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Appendix B
The Eyes Test
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Appendix C
The Self Report Altruism Scale (Ruston, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981)
Check the category on the right that conforms to the frequency with which you have
carried out the following acts.

Neve
r
1. I have helped push a stranger’s car out of the
snow.
2. I have given directions to a stranger.
3. I have made change for a stranger.
4. I have given money to a charity.
5. I have given money to a stranger who needed it
(or asked me for it).
6. I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.
7. I have done volunteer work for a charity.
8. I have donated blood.
9. I have helped carry a stranger’s belongings
(books, parcels, etc.).
10. I have delayed an elevator and held the door
open for a stranger.

Onc
e

More
than
once

Ofte
n

Very
often
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11. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a
lineup (at photocopy machine, in the
supermarket).
12. I have given a stranger a lift in my car.
13. I have pointed out a clerk’s error (in a bank, at
the supermarket) in undercharging me for an
item.
14. I have let a neighbour whom I didn’t know too
well borrow an item of some value to me (e.g., a
dish, tools, etc.)
15. I have bought ‘charity” Christmas cards
deliberately because I knew it was a good cause.
16. I have helped a classmate who I did not know
that well with a homework assignment when my
knowledge was greater than his or hers.
17. I have before being asked, voluntarily looked
after a neighbour’s pets or children without
being paid for it.
18. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly
stranger across a street.
19. I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a
stranger who was standing.
20. I have helped an acquaintance to move
households.
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Appendix D
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961)

a.
b.
c.
d.

I do not feel sad.
I feel sad
I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.
I am so sad and unhappy that I can't stand it.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
I feel discouraged about the future.
I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
I feel the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I do not feel like a failure.
I feel I have failed more than the average person.
As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
I feel I am a complete failure as a person.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I don't feel particularly guilty
I feel guilty a good part of the time.
I feel quite guilty most of the time.
I feel guilty all of the time.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I don't feel I am being punished.
I feel I may be punished.
I expect to be punished.
I feel I am being punished.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I don't feel disappointed in myself.
I am disappointed in myself.
I am disgusted with myself.
I hate myself.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
I blame myself all the time for my faults.
I blame myself for everything bad that happens.

a. I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
b. I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
c. I would like to kill myself.
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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

d. I would kill myself if I had the chance.
a.
b.
c.
d.

I don't cry any more than usual.
I cry more now than I used to.
I cry all the time now.
I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I am no more irritated by things than I ever was.
I am slightly more irritated now than usual.
I am quite annoyed or irritated a good deal of the time.
I feel irritated all the time.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I have not lost interest in other people.
I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
I have lost most of my interest in other people.
I have lost all of my interest in other people.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
I put off making decisions more than I used to.
I have greater difficulty in making decisions more than I used to.
I can't make decisions at all anymore.

a. I don't feel that I look any worse than I used to.
b. I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
c. I feel there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look
unattractive
d. I believe that I look ugly.
a.
b.
c.
d.

I can work about as well as before.
It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
I can't do any work at all.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I can sleep as well as usual.
I don't sleep as well as I used to.
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.
I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.

a.
b.
c.
d.

I don't get more tired than usual.
I get tired more easily than I used to.
I get tired from doing almost anything.
I am too tired to do anything.

a. My appetite is no worse than usual.
b. My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
c. My appetite is much worse now.
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19.

20.

21.

d. I have no appetite at all anymore.
a.
b.
c.
d.

I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
I have lost more than five pounds.
I have lost more than ten pounds.
I have lost more than fifteen pounds.

a. I am no more worried about my health than usual.
b. I am worried about physical problems like aches, pains, upset stomach, or
constipation.
c. I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else.
d. I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think of anything else.
a.
b.
c.
d.

I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
I have almost no interest in sex.
I have lost interest in sex completely.
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Appendix E
Scale for Suicide Ideation (Beck et al, 1979)
1. Wish to live
a. Moderate to strong
b. Weak
c. None
2. Wish to die
a. None
b. Weak
c. Moderate to strong
3. Reasons for living/dying
a. For living outweigh for dying
b. About equal
c. For dying outweigh for living
4. Desire to make active suicide attempt
a. None
b. Weak
c. Moderate to strong
5. Passive suicidal desire
a. Would take precautions to save life
b. Would leave life/death to chance
c. Would avoid steps necessary to save or maintain life
6. Time dimension: Duration of suicide ideation/wish
a. Brief, fleeting periods
b. Longer periods
c. Continuous (chronic) or almost continuous
7. Time dimension: Frequency of suicide
a. Rare, occasional
b. Intermittent
c. Persistent or continuous
8. Attitude toward ideation/wish
a. Rejecting
b. Ambivalent; indifferent
c. Accepting
9. Control over suicidal action/acting-out wis
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a. Has sense of control
b. Unsure of control
c. Has no sense of control
10. Deterrents to active attempt (e.g., family, religion, irreversibility)
a. Would not attempt because of a deterrent
b. Some concern about deterrents
c. Minimal or no concern about deterrents
11. Reason for contemplated attempt
a. To manipulate the environment; get attention, revenge
b. Combination of 0 and 2
c. Escape, surcease, solve problems
12. Method: Specificity/planning of contemplated attempt
a. Not considered
b. Considered, but details not worked out
c. Details worked out/well formulated
13. Method: Availability/opportunity for contemplated attempt
a. Method not available; no opportunity
b. Method would take time/effort; opportunity not readily available
c. Method and opportunity available
d. Future opportunity or availability of method anticipated
14. Sense of "capability" to carry out attempt
a. No courage, too weak, afraid, incompetent
b. Unsure of courage, competence
c. Sure of competence, courage
15. Expectancy/anticipation of actual attempt
a. No
b. Uncertain, not sure
c. Yes
16. Actual preparation for contemplated attempt
a. None
b. Partial (e.g., starting to collect pills)
c. Complete (e.g., had pills, loaded gun)
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Nick Wan

Psychology Ph.D. candidate
Email: hellonickwan@gmail.com
Find me on Twitter (@nickwan), GitHub (nickwan), Google Scholar (search “Nick Wan scholar”), and
LinkedIn (realnickwan)

Current generalized workflow

Import data (SQL, API) → Explore (Python, R; prefer Python) → Analyze (stats, machine
learning) → Push code up (git) → Review and revise analysis (with team) → report (to
stakeholders + team) → discuss next steps (with stakeholders + team)

Recent publications, presentations, & works
Feb 2020

The Ohio State University Open Questions in Sports Analytics Research

Aug 2019

Joint Statistics Meetings

Statistical Analysis of Esports Data

Mar 2018

Human Brain Mapping

A functional near‐infrared spectroscopic
investigation of speech production during reading

Work experience
Manager of Data Science at Kentucky
Fried Chicken

Manage the KFC US data science team. Work on
customer level projections and franchise
operation optimization.

Data scientist at Cincinnati Reds
(December 2016 - 2020)

Player projection and optimization. Collaborative
work with staff and coaches. Neuroscience
research and method implementation for players
and staff. Manage interns.
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Projects include sports analytics, esports
analytics, generative text models, coding
education, statistics education, neuroscience
education.

Research assistant at Multisensory
Cognition Laboratory (Utah State)
(May 2013 – April 2017)

Research in decision making and social cognitive
processing during strategy usage.
Instrumentation: EEG, fNIRS, fMRI, tDCS, eye
tracking, psychometrics

Education
2013 - 2017

Utah State University

Ph.D candidate in Psychology

2010 - 2012

Saint Mary’s College of California

B.S. in Experimental Psychology
and Neuroscience

2006 - 2010
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